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LEGISLATION
A Revised Federal Trade Commission Act-The Wheeler-Lea
Amendment
Upon the signing by the President on March 21, 1938 of the Wheeler-Lea
Amendment in the form agreed upon by a conference committee of both Houses
of Congress, there occurred the first major change in the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act during the twenty-four years subsequent to its enactment. The
purpose of the revision may be briefly stated as the enlargement of the scope of
the Commission's jurisdiction, the augmentation of its powers of enforcement
and investigation, and the granting of a specific remedy for deceptive use of
advertising media in connection with food, drugs, curative devices and cosmetics.
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Thus, the effect of the revision is largely to change the purpose of the Commis-
sion from the curtailment of monopolistic tendencies, to one charged with the
arbitration of disputes between competing businesses, and with the protection of
the public from unfair practices. As will be subsequently shown, the provisions
enlarging the jurisdiction and improving the administrative procedure of the
Commission are primarily designed to counteract the effect of limitations imposed
by judicial interpretation of the original act, while the stipulations relating to
the dissemination of false advertising are completely new additions to the Act.
A relatively unimportant change included in the amended Act is the inclu-
sion in section i of the original act ' of a provision that upon the expiration of his
term, a Commissioner shall continue in office until his successor is appointed.2
Although nothing in the old Act prohibited a Commissioner from so remaining, a
provision that the powers of the Commission should not be impaired by a va-
cancy indicates that the practice was not contemplated. Normally, the new pro-
vision should prove advantageous, especially since it eliminates the necessity
of a Commissioner being withdrawn in the midst of an investigation because of
the expiration of his term. Since no limit is placed on the time in which 0" suc-
cessor shall be appointed, there exists the possibility, though not a probability,
that the new provision could be used by the President to continue a Commis-
sioner in office without a definite appointment, and to leave the duration of his
term to the pleasure of the chief executive.
Section 2 of the Amendment merely provides new definitions in addition to
those already contained in section 4 of the existing Act. In a letter to the Sen-
ate Committee, the Federal Trade Commission stated that there was doubt as
to whether the trust, or the so-called Massachusetts Trust, was within the mean-
ing of the words "company or association" as used in the original act.3 These
are now expressly included in the definition of the word "corporation". A limi-
tation upon the meaning of corporation as used in the Act has been provided by
the exclusion from the definition of associations of those which do not carry on
a business for their own profit or for that of their members. The scope of the
words "documentary evidence" is clarified by the inclusion within that term of
books of account and financial and corporate records. The definition of "Anti-
trust Acts" has been enlarged by adding to the Sherman Act,4 the Clayton Act,5
and an act regulating combinations in restrain of foreign trade.6 The inclusion
of the Communications Act as an act to regulate commerce will apparently ex-
empt persons within section 3 (h) thereof 7 from the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.8
Jurisdictional Changes
It has been stated that most of the complaints issued by the Commission
have been based upon the authority conferred by section 5.9 In view of this
fact, even an otherwise trivial Amendment to this section may become important.
i. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §41 (937).
2. Pub. L. No. 447, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (March 21, 1938).
3. SEN. REP. No. 221, 75th Cong., ist Sess. (1937) 5. But see Guarantee Veterinary
Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 285 Fed. 853 (1922) in which a trust was held to be subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission.
4. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. §8 1-11 (927).
5. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §r 72-27 (927).
6. 28 STAT. 509, H 73-77 (1894), as amended 37 STAT. 667 (1913), 15 U. S. C. A. § 8
(1927).
7. 48 STAT. 1064, § 3 (934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 153 (n) (Supp. 1938).
8. Supra note i, at § 45.
9. Holliday, The Federal Trade Commission (1922) 8 A. B. A. J. 293, 296.
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It may be contended, however, that the changes made by the new Act will prove
to be of more theoretical than of practical import.
The conditions surrounding the passage of the Federal Trade Commission
Act clearly indicate that it was evolved primarily for the purpose of providing
an administrative agency to regulate commercial tendencies which had not yet
attained sufficient stature to fall within the jurisdiction of the anti-trust laws,
but which were definitely restrictive of that free competition which then was con-
sidered the economic goal of the nation.'0 To this end, section 5 of the Act de-
clared unfair methods of competition in commerce to be unlawful, and the courts,
in construing this section, have emphasized the fact that before the jurisdiction of
the Commission could be invoked, the unfair method must be shown to have a
harmful effect upon competition. Thus the Supreme Court in Federal Trade
Comm. v. Raladam Co.," declared as the three pre-requisites to the exercise
of power by the Commission, (i) that the method complained of be unfair,
(2) that it be a method of competition in commerce and (3) that a proceeding
by the Commission would be in the interest of the public. The word "com-
petition" was held to import the existence of present or potential competitors
whose business would be injuriously affected by the method in question. While
injury to a competitor was necessary to the jurisdiction of the Commission,
the theory was not that the competitor should be protected, but rather that the
public interest in free competition should be secured. 12 The Supreme Court has
also ruled that injury to the public must be shown in order to bring the case
within the public interest requirement, and that a showing that the act com-
plained of resulted in confusion of the public, without injury to them, was insuffi-
cient."' This curtails a previous decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit that a specific finding by the Commission that its action in bring-
ing the complaint is in the public interest is unnecessary and that, in the absence
of evidence of arbitrary exercise of discretion, the bringing of the complaint is
sufficient proof of the public interest involved.' 4
Inasmuch as the Commission's powers have been exercised not so much to
prevent monopolistic tendencies in business as to adjudicate private disputes
based on abuse of the privilege of free competition, the theory has arisen that
its essential function is to protect the consuming public, and that the old section
5 (a), construed by the courts so as to place the emphasis on the competitive
element, is inadequate for this purpose. The addition in the new section 5 (a)
of the prohibition of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce" was
proposed for the avowed purpose of extending the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion to all acts affecting or deceiving the public, and of eliminating the time and
expense involved in proving injury to competitors.' 5 While it is not to be ex-
pected that many cases will arise under the amended section which could not have
been dealt with under the old, the change will have the effect of reconciling the
theoretical purpose of the Commission with the results it actually accomplishes,
and will simplify the task of bringing many of the complaints within its juris-
diction through the elimination of procedural difficulties. It should also be
noticed that the unfair act complained of need no longer be so established as to
be within the meaning commonly imputed to the word "method", and may be
prohibited before it has progressed to that stage.' 6
10. BLAISDELL, THE FEDERAL TRADE CommIssIoN (1932) 5.
II. 283 U. S. 643 (I93I).
12. (1938) I N. A. M. L. DIG. 84.
13. Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 28o U. S. i (1929).
14. Moir v. Federal Trade Commission, 12 F. (2d) 22 (C. C. A. Ist, 1926).
15. SEN. RE'. No. 221, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (937) 3.
i6. But see dicta in Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 29 F. (2d) 49, 5I
(C. C. A. 6th, 1928) to the effect that a single act could constitute substantial evidence of an
unfair method of competition under the old act.
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It seems improbable that the extension of the Commission's jurisdiction in-
volved here will raise any serious constitutional questions. Attacks on the orig-
inal Act on the grounds that it was indefinite, and a delegation of legislative
power were not sustained, 17 and it is difficult to find any additional objections in
the present revision. While, at first glance, an unfair or deceptive act in com-
merce may seem to be more difficult of definition than an unfair method of
competition, it does not present a more difficult standard to apply in a given
factual situation. The principal distinction is that while the word "unfair" in
the original phrase definitely related to competition or competitors, it now has
no relation to anyone unless it is construed as meaning unfair to the public.
Having related it to the public, the unfairness is as capable of determination as
it was in relation to competition. The Amendment makes no change with respect
to the problem of whether the power of the Commission may constitutionally
be applied to acts which, though intrastate in nature, bear some relation to inter-
state commerce.
Procedural Revision
The remainder of section 5 of the new Act revises the original Act with a
view to removing flaws in the procedural machinery of the Commission, and to
expediting the performance of its functions. The most important change, in this
respect, is the provision for the review of orders of the Commission by the
circuit courts of appeal. It often has been reiterated that the Federal Trade
Commission exercises administrative and not judicial powers.18 This has been
interpreted to mean that its function is restricted to the finding of facts, which
to be effective, must be adopted by the circuit court of appeals,10 but which, if
supported by the evidence, are conclusive on the court.2 0  Furthermore, the
enforcement of the cease and desist orders of the Commission rested solely with
the circuit court, and could be had only upon application by the Commission.
Confusion has resulted from conflicting decisions of the courts of the Second
and Seventh Circuits as to whether such enforcement could be had, and an
order of the circuit court obtained, without showing that the Commission's order
had been violated. 21 It is clear that while the finding of facts were conclusive,
the order of the Commission was effective only at the pleasure of the party pro-
ceeded against until action had been taken by a circuit court. One of the main
objectives of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment is to relieve the Commission of the
necessity of establishing its order in the court before it becomes effective, unless
the validity of the order is attacked by a petition for review filed by the party
affected. To this end, section 5 (g) provides that an order to cease and desist
shall become final if no petition for review is filed within sixty days of the
service of the order; 22 upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a peti-
tion of certiorari if the order has been affirmed by the circuit court of appeals
or the petition for review dismissed; upon the denial of a petition for certiorari
under the same conditions; or upon the expiration of thirty days from the date
of issuance of a mandate of the Supreme Court if such Court directs that the
order be affirmed or the petition dismissed. Section 5 (1) provides for a civil
17. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 258 Fed. 307 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919).
iS. Federal Trade Comm. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U. S. 61g (1927) ; Chamber of
Commerce of Minneapolis v Federal Trade Comm., 280 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922).
19. Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Comm., 28o Fed. 45 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1922).
20. Federal Trade Comm. v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S. 67 (2934).
21. Compare Federal Trade Comm. v. Standard Education Society, 14 F. (2d) 947 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1926) with Federal Trade Comm. v. Balme, 23 F. (2d) 615 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
22. Section 5 (c) sets forth the procedure for obtaining review and establishes the limit
of sixty days.
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penalty for violation of the order after it has become final and which shall accrue
to the United States and be recoverable in a civil action brought by the Federal
Government.
From the foregoing discussion it would seem that the effect of the Amend-
ment is to confer an element of judicial power upon the Commission which it had
previously lacked. It was said of the old act that since a hearing was granted
by the Commission with an ultimate review by the circuit court of appeals, there
was no denial of due process of law.2 3 Under the amended section, there may
be review by the circuit court only if the party against whom the order is issued
asks for it within a specified time, and should he fail to ask, thus assuming the
expense and burden of initiating the proceeding, he will be subjected to a pen-
alty without such a review.2 4 The question may arise as to whether the court
hearing the action by the United States to recover the penalty will have juris-
diction to consider the validity of the order, or whether it will be limited to a
consideration of whether there has been a violation of the order so as to subject
the defendant to the penalty. Apparently, the question has not arisen under the
very similar provisions of the Packers and Stockyards Act.
2 5
As originally drawn by the Senate, the Amendment contained the old pro-
vision relating to applications by the Commission to the circuit court of appeals
for enforcement of its order whenever the party against whom the order was
issued failed to obey it, but amended it so as to provide that it would be unnec-
essary for the Commission to first prove violation of the order,2 6 thus resolving
the aforementioned conflict between the Seventh and Second Circuits in favor
of the latter.2 7 This entire provision was eliminated by the conference commit-
tee of the two Houses, apparently on the theory that it was unnecessary inas-
much as the Commission's order automatically becomes final upon the expira-
tion of the sixty day period. However, it seems that the Commission is now ren-
dered powerless to prevent violation of its order during that time. This is
peculiar in view of the fact that upon the filing of the petition for review, the
circuit court is given power to enjoin violation pendente lite because of the dam-
age which might occur before disposition of the case.
The Wheeler-Lea Amendment further provides in section 5 (b) that the
Commission may modify or set aside its order at any time until the expiration
of the time allowed for filing the petition for review, or until the filing of the
transcript of the record in the proceedings before the Commission in the court
following the filing of such petition. After the expiration of the sixty days, the
Commission may modify or set aside its order with the consent of the party
affected.
Section 5 (c) not only adds the sixty-day limitation to the procedure for
obtaining review of the Commission's order, but further amplifies the power
of the court by giving it authority to issue such writs as are ancillary to its
jurisdiction or, in its judgment, are necessary to prevent injury to the public
pendente lite. The obvious purpose of this provision is to provide a method of
terminating business practices which would injuriously affect the public or com-
petitors if allowed to continue during litigation. Somewhat similar provisions are
found in the Packers and Stockyards Act,28 and the Securities Exchange Act.
2 9
To the extent that the court affirms the order of the Commission, it issues its own
23. Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Comm., 28o Fed. 45 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1922).
24. A similar provision in the Packers and Stockyards Act has been sustained. Trunz
Pork Stores, Inc. v. Wallace, 7o F. (2d) 688 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
25. 42 STAT. 159, 163 (921), 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 194-195 (927).
26. SEN. BILL No. 1077, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937) 7.
27. Supra note 21.
28. 42 STAT. 159, 163 (I921), 7 U. S. C. A. § 194 (1927).
29. 48 STAT. 881, 901 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78Y (b) (Supp. 1938).
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order commanding obedience to its terms. Subsection (c) is also intended to
clarify the existing provisions by the statement that the findings of the Com-
mission shall be conclusive if supported by "evidence", the term being considered
more inclusive than the former requirement of "testimony".30
Section 5, subsections (h), (i), (j) and (k) of the Wheeler-Lea Amend-
ment find no counterpart in the original act. Their purpose is to further
clarify the time at which an order of the Commission becomes final by making
express provisions concerning it in the event that the order is appealed either to
a circuit court of appeals or to the Supreme Court. Section 5 (h) therefore
stipulates that if the order is modified or set aside by the Supreme Court, the
order of the Commission rendered in accordance with the mandate of the Su-
preme Court shall become final thirty days after its date unless, in the mean-
time, either party has instituted proceedings to have the order corrected to con-
form to the mandate. In that event, the order becomes final when corrected.
Similarly, section 5 (i) provides that when the order is modified or set aside
by a circuit court of appeals, and either the time allowed for filing a petition
for certiorari has expired without the filing of a petition, or certiorari has been
denied, or the decision of the circuit court has been affirmed, then the order of
the Commission rendered in accordance with the mandate of the circuit court
is to become final in the same manner as under subsection (h). Section 5 (j)
provides for finality of the order in the event that the Supreme Court or circuit
court orders a rehearing, by directing that when opportunity for certiorari has
passed or the decision of the circuit court affirmed, the order rendered upon
rehearing shall become final in the same manner as though no prior order of
the Commission had been rendered. Section 5 (k) merely defines the term
"mandate" as the final mandate.
Regulation of Advertising
The Federal Trade Commission Act, and those changes made in it by the
Wheeler-Lea Amendment which have already been discussed, have been framed
for the purpose of providing a means of regulating trade in general. However,
sections 12, 13, 14, 15 and i6, added by the amendment, are aimed at the pre-
vention of a specific abuse in a particular field of trade, namely, the dissemina-
tion of false or misleading advertising of food, drugs, devices and cosmetics.
The intention of Congress undoubtedly is to supplement the provisions of the
Pure Food and Drug Act relating to the misbranding of drugs or articles of
food,3" by taking action against false advertisements in addition to labels, and
by utilizing the enforcement procedure of the Federal Trade Commission to pro-
vide civil as well as criminal penalties.
To this end, section 12 (a) (i) provides that it shall be unlawful for any
person, partnership or corporation to disseminate or cause to be disseminated
any false advertisement by the mails or in interstate commerce by any means,
for the purpose of inducing, or which is likely to induce, directly or indirectly,
the purchase of such articles. The meaning of this provision appears clear; it
applies only to advertisements disseminated in interstate commerce and makes
the intent to induce the purchase of these products immaterial, although it is
difficult to understand for what other reason a product would be advertised.
Section 12 (a) (2) is broader, relating as it does, to an advertisement dissemi-
nated by any means for the purpose of inducing, or which is likely to induce, di-
rectly or indirectly, the purchase of food, drugs, devices and cosmetics in interstate
commerce. This would appear to be a legislative determination that the purely
intrastate act of advertising a product subject to interstate sale is an act so
3o. Supra note 15, at 8.
31. 34 STAT. 768 (i9o6), 21 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-15 (1927).
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affecting interstate commerce as to subject itself to federal regulation. In addi-
tion, section 12 (b) provides that any act made unlawful by section 12 (a)
shall be an unfair or deceptive act incommerce under section 5. Thus, while
the general question of the applicability of section 5 to intrastate acts affecting
interstate commerce remains one for the courts to determine, it is settled by the
legislature when the act complained of is the false advertisement of food, drugs,
devices or cosmetics. The constitutionality of this provision will probably not
present a serious problem. By the National Labor Relations Act, Congress
assumed regulatory power over intrastate practices which it declared burdened
interstate commerce 32 and this provision recently has been sustained.33 Fur-
thermore, the court has recognized that intrastate acts which pertain to the intro-
duction of goods into the state from without are interstate in nature and, therefore,
not subject to state regulation.34 It would follow that such acts are subject to
federal regulation.
Section 13 (a) provides that when the Commission has reason to believe
that any person, partnership or corporation is violating or about to violate sec-
tion 12, and that the enjoining of the violation pending proceedings by the
Commission under section 5 is to the interest of the public, it may sue for an
injunction in a United States District Court and upon a proper showing, a
temporary injunction shall be granted without bond. Subsection (b), how-
ever, provides that when the delivery of a particular issue of a publication
would be delayed after the regular time therefor by an injunction restrain-
ing the dissemination of a false advertisement contained in the issue, that issue
may be excluded from the operation of the injunction. Such exclusion may be
had, however, only when the delay would be caused by the customary method
of manufacture and distribution of the publication, and not due to an attempt to
evade the Act. Objection to section 13 was made by some members of the
House committee on the ground that since the advertisement is not subject to
the Act unless it is misleading in a material respect, the Commission should not
have been given a discretionary power to decide whether or not the suit for an
injunction would be to the interest of the public, and that this limitation should
be removed making it mandatory upon the Commission to seek the injunction. 5
This objection overlooks the fact that the advertisement may be materially mis-
leading and yet not be of sufficient importance to justify the added burden on
the courts of the use of injunctive procedure designed to assist the Commission
in cases where speed in acting is essential. Subsection (b) is a recognition by
Congress of the fact that the rights of innocent parties should be protected as
far as possible without interfering with the proper exercise of the Commis-
sion's functions.
While the dissemination of false advertisements of food, drugs, devices and
cosmetics is normally subject to civil penalties under section 5, criminal penal-
ties are also provided in section 14 (a) to deal specifically with violations of sec-
tion 12 (a) which involve commodities whose normal or prescribed use is
injurious to health, and also with all intentional violations. Such violations are
denominated misdemeanors and are accordingly punished. Regard is again
shown for the innocent agents of dissemination by the provision in section 14 (b)
exempting publishers, radio broadcast licensees, and agencies or media for adver-
tising, from liability under section 14 (a), unless they refuse, upon request of
the Commission, to furnish the Commission with the name and address of the
manufacturer, packer, distributor, seller or advertising agency which caused
32. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § I51 (Supp. I938).
33. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 1. (,937).
34. Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507 (i9o6) ; Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Port-
land, 268 U. S. 325 (1925).
35. H. R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., ist Sess. (1937) 26.
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them to disseminate the false advertisement. Advertising agencies are in turn
exempted unless they refuse to reveal the name and address of the person behind
them.
If the teeth of the new provisions are to be found in section 14, it remains
for section 15 to supply the heart by defining a false advertisement within the
fneaning of the act. After broadly stating that a false advertisement is one,
other than labeling, which is misleading in a material respect, it then proceeds
to define the latter phrase. In determining whether an advertisement is mis-
leading in a material respect, there must be considered not only representations
made or suggested by any statement, word, design, device, sound or any com-
bination, but also omissions of facts material to such representations or to con-
sequences which may result from the normal use of the product, or from use
under any conditions prescribed by the advertisement. This definitely includes
articles which not only have no beneficial effect, but which may have harmful
consequences, against which section 14 (a) is directed. The original provision,
as introduced in the House of Representatives as an amendment to the Senate
bill, contained a provision excluding from the definition the advertisement of
articles concerning the effect of which qualified medical opinion differed, provided
that the fact of such division of opinion was indicated in the advertisement."8
The purpose of the provision was to conform with decisions of the Supreme
Court to the effect that Congress may not penalize the making of a statement
or representation about which qualified opinion differs, although a fraudulent
misrepresentation, depending on the existence of a state of mind, can be pro-
hibited.3 7 The provision was discarded by the conference committee as unneces-
sary,38 but will probably be reinserted by the courts in applying the Act to spe-
cific cases. Special provision is made for advertisements circulated only among
members of the medical profession, in which case it will not be considered false
if it contains no false representation of a material fact and includes a truthful
disclosure of the formula. It should be noted that this definition requires that
the representation be false, rather than merely misleading, a distinction of little
consequence in view of the practical difficulty of misleading a qualified physician
who is furnished with the formula.
Subsections (b), (c), (d) and (e) of section 15 are intended to define,
as broadly as possible, the terms food, drugs, devices and cosmetics. Most note-
worthy is the fact that the terms include not only the articles themselves, but
also their components, regardless of the fact that the substance used as a com-
ponent would not otherwise be within the definition.39
Conclusion
It is impossible to predict the effect which the amended Act .will have upon
the practical administration of the Commission. It has reconciled the theoretical
and actual functions of the body, has filled gaps in its jurisdiction, and has
strengthened and emphasized its powers to regulate misleading advertising. Fur-
thermore, the Commission has been materially aided in being relieved of the
necessity of obtaining court sanction of its orders until appeal is taken by the
party affected. On the other hand, some of the changes, while clarifying, do not
appear to have been necessary. Were it not for the criminal provisions of sec-
36. Id. at 7.
37. Seven Cases of Eckman's Alterative v. United States, 239 U. S. 51o (1916).
38. H. R. REP. No. 1774, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) IO.
39. The remainder of the Act is concerned with administrative details. Section 16 pro-
vides for enforcement of sections 14 (a) and 5 (1) by the Attorney-General. Section 17 con-
tains the separability clause to the effect that the invalidity of one section shall not affect the
rest and section 18 provides for its citation as the "Federal Trade Commission Act".
